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Abstract
We identify obfuscated gradients, a kind of gradi-
ent masking, as a phenomenon that leads to a false
sense of security in defenses against adversarial
examples. While defenses that cause obfuscated
gradients appear to defeat iterative optimization-
based attacks, we find defenses relying on this
effect can be circumvented. We describe charac-
teristic behaviors of defenses exhibiting the effect,
and for each of the three types of obfuscated gra-
dients we discover, we develop attack techniques
to overcome it. In a case study, examining non-
certified white-box-secure defenses at ICLR 2018,
we find obfuscated gradients are a common occur-
rence, with 7 of 9 defenses relying on obfuscated
gradients. Our new attacks successfully circum-
vent 6 completely, and 1 partially, in the original
threat model each paper considers.
1. Introduction
In response to the susceptibility of neural networks to adver-
sarial examples (Szegedy et al., 2013; Biggio et al., 2013),
there has been significant interest recently in constructing de-
fenses to increase the robustness of neural networks. While
progress has been made in understanding and defending
against adversarial examples in the white-box setting, where
the adversary has full access to the network, a complete
solution has not yet been found.
As benchmarking against iterative optimization-based at-
tacks (e.g., Kurakin et al. (2016a); Madry et al. (2018);
Carlini & Wagner (2017c)) has become standard practice in
evaluating defenses, new defenses have arisen that appear to
be robust against these powerful optimization-based attacks.
We identify one common reason why many defenses provide
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apparent robustness against iterative optimization attacks:
obfuscated gradients, a term we define as a special case of
gradient masking (Papernot et al., 2017). Without a good
gradient, where following the gradient does not successfully
optimize the loss, iterative optimization-based methods can-
not succeed. We identify three types of obfuscated gradients:
shattered gradients are nonexistent or incorrect gradients
caused either intentionally through non-differentiable op-
erations or unintentionally through numerical instability;
stochastic gradients depend on test-time randomness; and
vanishing/exploding gradients in very deep computation
result in an unusable gradient.
We propose new techniques to overcome obfuscated gradi-
ents caused by these three phenomena. We address gradient
shattering with a new attack technique we call Backward
Pass Differentiable Approximation, where we approximate
derivatives by computing the forward pass normally and
computing the backward pass using a differentiable approx-
imation of the function. We compute gradients of random-
ized defenses by applying Expectation Over Transforma-
tion (Athalye et al., 2017). We solve vanishing/exploding
gradients through reparameterization and optimize over a
space where gradients do not explode/vanish.
To investigate the prevalence of obfuscated gradients and
understand the applicability of these attack techniques, we
use as a case study the ICLR 2018 non-certified defenses
that claim white-box robustness. We find that obfuscated
gradients are a common occurrence, with 7 of 9 defenses
relying on this phenomenon. Applying the new attack tech-
niques we develop, we overcome obfuscated gradients and
circumvent 6 of them completely, and 1 partially, under the
original threat model of each paper. Along with this, we
offer an analysis of the evaluations performed in the papers.
Additionally, we hope to provide researchers with a common
baseline of knowledge, description of attack techniques,
and common evaluation pitfalls, so that future defenses can
avoid falling vulnerable to these same attack approaches.
To promote reproducible research, we release our re-
implementation of each of these defenses, along with imple-
mentations of our attacks for each. 1
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2. Preliminaries
2.1. Notation
We consider a neural network f(·) used for classification
where f(x)i represents the probability that image x cor-
responds to label i. We classify images, represented as
x ∈ [0, 1]w·h·c for a c-channel image of width w and height
h. We use f j(·) to refer to layer j of the neural network, and
f1..j(·) the composition of layers 1 through j. We denote
the classification of the network as c(x) = arg maxif(x)i,
and c∗(x) denotes the true label.
2.2. Adversarial Examples
Given an image x and classifier f(·), an adversarial example
(Szegedy et al., 2013) x′ satisfies two properties: D(x, x′)
is small for some distance metric D, and c(x′) 6= c∗(x).
That is, for images, x and x′ appear visually similar but x′
is classified incorrectly.
In this paper, we use the `∞ and `2 distortion metrics to mea-
sure similarity. Two images which have a small distortion
under either of these metrics will appear visually identical.
We report `∞ distance in the normalized [0, 1] space, so that
a distortion of 0.031 corresponds to 8/256, and `2 distance
as the total root-mean-square distortion normalized by the
total number of pixels (as is done in prior work).
2.3. Datasets & Models
We evaluate these defenses on the same datasets on which
they claim robustness.
If a defense argues security on MNIST and any other dataset,
we only evaluate the defense on the larger dataset. On
MNIST and CIFAR-10, we evaluate defenses over the en-
tire test set and generate untargeted adversarial examples.
On ImageNet, we evaluate over 1000 randomly selected
images in the test set, construct targeted adversarial exam-
ples with randomly selected target classes, and report attack
success rate in addition to model accuracy. Generating tar-
geted adversarial examples is a strictly harder problem that
we believe is a more meaningful metric for evaluating at-
tacks. 2 Conversely, for a defender, the harder task is to
argue robustness to untargeted attacks.
We use standard models for each dataset. For MNIST we
use a standard 5-layer convolutional neural network which
reaches 99.3% accuracy. On CIFAR-10 we train a wide
ResNet (Zagoruyko & Komodakis, 2016; He et al., 2016)
to 95% accuracy. For ImageNet we use the InceptionV3
(Szegedy et al., 2016) network which reaches 78.0% top-1
and 93.9% top-5 accuracy.
2Misclassification is a less meaningful metric on ImageNet,
where a misclassification of closely related classes (e.g., a German
shepherd classified as a Doberman) may not be meaningful.
2.4. Threat Models
Prior work considers adversarial examples in white-box and
black-box threat models. In this paper, we consider defenses
designed for the white-box setting, where the adversary has
full access to the neural network classifier (architecture and
weights) and defense, but not test-time randomness (only
the distribution). We evaluate each defense under the threat
model under which it claims to be secure (e.g., bounded `∞
distortion of  = 0.031). It often easy to find impercepti-
bly perturbed adversarial examples by violating the threat
model, but by doing so under the original threat model, we
show that the original evaluations were inadequate and the
claims of defenses’ security were incorrect.
2.5. Attack Methods
We construct adversarial examples with iterative
optimization-based methods. For a given instance
x, these attacks attempt to search for a δ such that
c(x + δ) 6= c∗(x) either minimizing ‖δ‖, or maximizing
the classification loss on f(x+ δ). To generate `∞ bounded
adversarial examples we use Projected Gradient Descent
(PGD) confined to a specified `∞ ball; for `2, we use the
Lagrangian relaxation of Carlini & Wagner (2017c). We
use between 100 and 10,000 iterations of gradient descent,
as needed to obtain convergance. The specific choice of
optimizer is far less important than choosing to use iterative
optimization-based methods (Madry et al., 2018).
3. Obfuscated Gradients
A defense is said to cause gradient masking if it “does
not have useful gradients” for generating adversarial exam-
ples (Papernot et al., 2017); gradient masking is known to
be an incomplete defense to adversarial examples (Papernot
et al., 2017; Trame`r et al., 2018). Despite this, we observe
that 7 of the ICLR 2018 defenses rely on this effect.
To contrast from previous defenses which cause gradient
masking by learning to break gradient descent (e.g., by learn-
ing to make the gradients point the wrong direction (Trame`r
et al., 2018)), we refer to the case where defenses are de-
signed in such a way that the constructed defense necessarily
causes gradient masking as obfuscated gradients. We dis-
cover three ways in which defenses obfuscate gradients (we
use this word because in these cases, it is the defense creator
who has obfuscated the gradient information); we briefly
define and discuss each of them.
Shattered Gradients are caused when a defense is non-
differentiable, introduces numeric instability, or otherwise
causes a gradient to be nonexistent or incorrect. Defenses
that cause gradient shattering can do so unintentionally,
by using differentiable operations but where following the
gradient does not maximize classification loss globally.
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Stochastic Gradients are caused by randomized defenses,
where either the network itself is randomized or the input
is randomly transformed before being fed to the classifier,
causing the gradients to become randomized. This causes
methods using a single sample of the randomness to incor-
rectly estimate the true gradient.
Exploding & Vanishing Gradients are often caused by de-
fenses that consist of multiple iterations of neural network
evaluation, feeding the output of one computation as the
input of the next. This type of computation, when unrolled,
can be viewed as an extremely deep neural network evalua-
tion, which can cause vanishing/exploding gradients.
3.1. Identifying Obfuscated & Masked Gradients
Some defenses intentionally break gradient descent and
cause obfuscated gradients. However, others defenses unin-
tentionally break gradient descent, but the cause of gradient
descent being broken is a direct result of the design of the
neural network. We discuss below characteristic behaviors
of defenses which cause this to occur. These behaviors may
not perfectly characterize all cases of masked gradients.
One-step attacks perform better than iterative attacks.
Iterative optimization-based attacks applied in a white-box
setting are strictly stronger than single-step attacks and
should give strictly superior performance. If single-step
methods give performance superior to iterative methods, it
is likely that the iterative attack is becoming stuck in its
optimization search at a local minimum.
Black-box attacks are better than white-box attacks.
The black-box threat model is a strict subset of the white-
box threat model, so attacks in the white-box setting should
perform better; if a defense is obfuscating gradients, then
black-box attacks (which do not use the gradient) often per-
form better than white-box attacks (Papernot et al., 2017).
Unbounded attacks do not reach 100% success. With
unbounded distortion, any classifier should have 0% robust-
ness to attack. If an attack does not reach 100% success
with sufficiently large distortion bound, this indicates the
attack is not performing optimally against the defense, and
the attack should be improved.
Random sampling finds adversarial examples. Brute-
force random search (e.g., randomly sampling 105 or more
points) within some -ball should not find adversarial exam-
ples when gradient-based attacks do not.
Increasing distortion bound does not increase success.
A larger distortion bound should monotonically increase
attack success rate; significantly increasing distortion bound
should result in significantly higher attack success rate.
4. Attack Techniques
Generating adversarial examples through optimization-
based methods requires useful gradients obtained through
backpropagation (Rumelhart et al., 1986). Many defenses
therefore either intentionally or unintentionally cause gradi-
ent descent to fail because of obfuscated gradients caused
by gradient shattering, stochastic gradients, or vanish-
ing/exploding gradients. We discuss a number of techniques
that we develop to overcome obfuscated gradients.
4.1. Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation
Shattered gradients, caused either unintentionally, e.g. by
numerical instability, or intentionally, e.g. by using non-
differentiable operations, result in nonexistent or incorrect
gradients. To attack defenses where gradients are not readily
available, we introduce a technique we call Backward Pass
Differentiable Approximation (BPDA) 3.
4.1.1. A SPECIAL CASE:
THE STRAIGHT-THROUGH ESTIMATOR
As a special case, we first discuss what amounts to the
straight-through estimator (Bengio et al., 2013) applied to
constructing adversarial examples.
Many non-differentiable defenses can be expressed as fol-
lows: given a pre-trained classifier f(·), construct a prepro-
cessor g(·) and let the secured classifier fˆ(x) = f(g(x))
where the preprocessor g(·) satisfies g(x) ≈ x (e.g., such a
g(·) may perform image denoising to remove the adversar-
ial perturbation, as in Guo et al. (2018)). If g(·) is smooth
and differentiable, then computing gradients through the
combined network fˆ is often sufficient to circumvent the
defense (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b). However, recent work
has constructed functions g(·) which are neither smooth
nor differentiable, and therefore can not be backpropagated
through to generate adversarial examples with a white-box
attack that requires gradient signal.
Because g is constructed with the property that g(x) ≈ x,
we can approximate its derivative as the derivative of the
identity function: ∇xg(x) ≈ ∇xx = 1. Therefore, we can
approximate the derivative of f(g(x)) at the point xˆ as:
∇xf(g(x))|x=xˆ ≈ ∇xf(x)|x=g(xˆ)
This allows us to compute gradients and therefore mount a
white-box attack. Conceptually, this attack is simple. We
perform forward propagation through the neural network as
usual, but on the backward pass, we replace g(·) with the
identity function. In practice, the implementation can be ex-
pressed in an even simpler way: we approximate∇xf(g(x))
by evaluating ∇xf(x) at the point g(x). This gives us an
3The BPDA approach can be used on an arbitrary network,
even if it is already differentiable, to obtain a more useful gradient.
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approximation of the true gradient, and while not perfect, is
sufficiently useful that when averaged over many iterations
of gradient descent still generates an adversarial example.
The math behind the validity of this approach is similar to
the special case.
4.1.2. GENERALIZED ATTACK: BPDA
While the above attack is effective for a simple class of
networks expressible as f(g(x)) when g(x) ≈ x, it is not
fully general. We now generalize the above approach into
our full attack, which we call Backward Pass Differentiable
Approximation (BPDA).
Let f(·) = f1...j(·) be a neural network, and let f i(·) be a
non-differentiable (or not usefully-differentiable) layer. To
approximate∇xf(x), we first find a differentiable approxi-
mation g(x) such that g(x) ≈ f i(x). Then, we can approxi-
mate∇xf(x) by performing the forward pass through f(·)
(and in particular, computing a forward pass through f i(x)),
but on the backward pass, replacing f i(x) with g(x). Note
that we perform this replacement only on the backward pass.
As long as the two functions are similar, we find that the
slightly inaccurate gradients still prove useful in construct-
ing an adversarial example. Applying BPDA often requires
more iterations of gradient descent than without because
each individual gradient descent step is not exactly correct.
We have found applying BPDA is often necessary: replacing
f i(·) with g(·) on both the forward and backward pass is
either completely ineffective (e.g. with Song et al. (2018)) or
many times less effective (e.g. with Buckman et al. (2018)).
4.2. Attacking Randomized Classifiers
Stochastic gradients arise when using randomized transfor-
mations to the input before feeding it to the classifier or
when using a stochastic classifier. When using optimization-
based attacks on defenses that employ these techniques, it is
necessary to estimate the gradient of the stochastic function.
Expectation over Transformation. For defenses that em-
ploy randomized transformations to the input, we apply Ex-
pectation over Transformation (EOT) (Athalye et al., 2017)
to correctly compute the gradient over the expected trans-
formation to the input.
When attacking a classifier f(·) that first randomly trans-
forms its input according to a function t(·) sampled from a
distribution of transformations T , EOT optimizes the expec-
tation over the transformation Et∼T f(t(x)). The optimiza-
tion problem can be solved by gradient descent, noting that
∇Et∼T f(t(x)) = Et∼T∇f(t(x)), differentiating through
the classifier and transformation, and approximating the
expectation with samples at each gradient descent step.
4.3. Reparameterization
We solve vanishing/exploding gradients by reparameteriza-
tion. Assume we are given a classifier f(g(x)) where g(·)
performs some optimization loop to transform the input x
to a new input xˆ. Often times, this optimization loop means
that differentiating through g(·), while possible, yields ex-
ploding or vanishing gradients.
To resolve this, we make a change-of-variable x = h(z)
for some function h(·) such that g(h(z)) = h(z) for all
z, but h(·) is differentiable. For example, if g(·) projects
samples to some manifold in a specific manner, we might
construct h(z) to return points exclusively on the manifold.
This allows us to compute gradients through f(h(z)) and
thereby circumvent the defense.
5. Case Study: ICLR 2018 Defenses
As a case study for evaluating the prevalence of obfuscated
gradients, we study the ICLR 2018 non-certified defenses
that argue robustness in a white-box threat model. Each of
these defenses argues a high robustness to adaptive, white-
box attacks. We find that seven of these nine defenses rely
on this phenomenon, and we demonstrate that our tech-
niques can completely circumvent six of those (and partially
circumvent one) that rely on obfuscated gradients. We omit
two defenses with provable security claims (Raghunathan
et al., 2018; Sinha et al., 2018) and one that only argues
black-box security (Trame`r et al., 2018). We include one
paper, Ma et al. (2018), that was not proposed as a defense
per se, but suggests a method to detect adversarial examples.
There is an asymmetry in attacking defenses versus con-
structing robust defenses: to show a defense can be by-
passed, it is only necessary to demonstrate one way to do
so; in contrast, a defender must show no attack can succeed.
Table 1 summarizes our results. Of the 9 accepted papers,
7 rely on obfuscated gradients. Two of these defenses
argue robustness on ImageNet, a much harder task than
CIFAR-10; and one argues robustness on MNIST, a much
easier task than CIFAR-10. As such, comparing defenses
across datasets is difficult.
5.1. Non-obfuscated Gradients
5.1.1. ADVERSARIAL TRAINING
Defense Details. Originally proposed by Goodfellow
et al. (2014b), adversarial training solves a min-max game
through a conceptually simple process: train on adversarial
examples until the model learns to classify them correctly.
Given training data X and loss function `(·), standard train-
ing chooses network weights θ as
θ∗ = arg min
θ
E
(x,y)∈X
`(x; y;Fθ).
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Defense Dataset Distance Accuracy
Buckman et al. (2018) CIFAR 0.031 (`∞) 0%∗
Ma et al. (2018) CIFAR 0.031 (`∞) 5%
Guo et al. (2018) ImageNet 0.005 (`2) 0%∗
Dhillon et al. (2018) CIFAR 0.031 (`∞) 0%
Xie et al. (2018) ImageNet 0.031 (`∞) 0%∗
Song et al. (2018) CIFAR 0.031 (`∞) 9%∗
Samangouei et al.
(2018)
MNIST 0.005 (`2) 55%∗∗
Madry et al. (2018) CIFAR 0.031 (`∞) 47%
Na et al. (2018) CIFAR 0.015 (`∞) 15%
Table 1. Summary of Results: Seven of nine defense techniques
accepted at ICLR 2018 cause obfuscated gradients and are vulner-
able to our attacks. Defenses denoted with ∗ propose combining
adversarial training; we report here the defense alone, see §5 for
full numbers. The fundamental principle behind the defense de-
noted with ∗∗ has 0% accuracy; in practice, imperfections cause
the theoretically optimal attack to fail, see §5.4.2 for details.
We study the adversarial training approach of Madry et al.
(2018) which for a given -ball solves
θ∗ = arg min
θ
E
(x,y)∈X
[
max
δ∈[−,]N
`(x+ δ; y;Fθ)
]
.
To approximately solve this formulation, the authors solve
the inner maximization problem by generating adversarial
examples using projected gradient descent.
Discussion. We believe this approach does not cause ob-
fuscated gradients: our experiments with optimization-
based attacks do succeed with some probability (but do
not invalidate the claims in the paper). Further, the authors’
evaluation of this defense performs all of the tests for charac-
teristic behaviors of obfuscated gradients that we list. How-
ever, we note that (1) adversarial retraining has been shown
to be difficult at ImageNet scale (Kurakin et al., 2016b),
and (2) training exclusively on `∞ adversarial examples
provides only limited robustness to adversarial examples
under other distortion metrics (Sharma & Chen, 2017).
5.1.2. CASCADE ADVERSARIAL TRAINING
Cascade adversarial machine learning (Na et al., 2018) is
closely related to the above defense. The main difference
is that instead of using iterative methods to generate ad-
versarial examples at each mini-batch, the authors train a
first model, generate adversarial examples (with iterative
methods) on that model, add these to the training set, and
then train a second model on the augmented dataset only
single-step methods for efficiency. Additionally, the authors
construct a “unified embedding” and enforce that the clean
and adversarial logits are close under some metric.
Discussion. Again, as above, we are unable to reduce the
claims made by the authors. However, these claims are
weaker than other defenses (because the authors correctly
performed a strong optimization-based attack (Carlini &
Wagner, 2017c)): 16% accuracy with  = .015, compared
to over 70% at the same perturbation budget with adversarial
training as in Madry et al. (2018).
5.2. Gradient Shattering
5.2.1. THERMOMETER ENCODING
Defense Details. In contrast to prior work (Szegedy et al.,
2013) which viewed adversarial examples as “blind spots”
in neural networks, Goodfellow et al. (2014b) argue that the
reason adversarial examples exist is that neural networks be-
have in a largely linear manner. The purpose of thermometer
encoding is to break this linearity.
Given an image x, for each pixel color xi,j,c, the l-level ther-
mometer encoding τ(xi,j,c) is a l-dimensional vector where
τ(xi,j,c)k = 1 if if xi,j,c > k/l, and 0 otherwise (e.g., for
a 10-level thermometer encoding, τ(0.66) = 1111110000).
Due to the discrete nature of thermometer encoded val-
ues, it is not possible to directly perform gradient descent
on a thermometer encoded neural network. The authors
therefore construct Logit-Space Projected Gradient Ascent
(LS-PGA) as an attack over the discrete thermometer en-
coded inputs. Using this attack, the authors perform the
adversarial training of Madry et al. (2018) on thermometer
encoded networks.
On CIFAR-10, just performing thermometer encoding was
found to give 50% accuracy within  = 0.031 under `∞
distortion. By performing adversarial training with 7 steps
of LS-PGA, robustness increased to 80%.
Discussion. While the intention behind this defense is to
break the local linearity of neural networks, we find that
this defense in fact causes gradient shattering. This can
be observed through their black-box attack evaluation: ad-
versarial examples generated on a standard adversarially
trained model transfer to a thermometer encoded model re-
ducing the accuracy to 67%, well below the 80% robustness
to the white-box iterative attack.
Evaluation. We use the BPDA approach from §4.1.2,
where we let f(x) = τ(x). Observe that if we define
τˆ(xi,j,c)k = min(max(xi,j,c − k/l, 0), 1)
then
τ(xi,j,c)k = floor(τˆ(xi,j,c)k)
so we can let g(x) = τˆ(x) and replace the backwards pass
with the function g(·).
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Figure 1. Model accuracy versus distortion (under `∞). Adversar-
ial training increases robustness to 50% at  = 0.031; thermometer
encoding by itself provides limited value, and when coupled with
adversarial training performs worse than adversarial training alone.
LS-PGA only reduces model accuracy to 50% on a
thermometer-encoded model trained without adversarial
training (bounded by  = 0.031). In contrast, we achieve
1% model accuracy with the lower  = 0.015 (and 0% with
 = 0.031). This shows no measurable improvement from
standard models, trained without thermometer encoding.
When we attack a thermometer-encoded adversarially
trained model 4, we are able to reproduce the 80% accu-
racy at  = 0.031 claim against LS-PGA. However, our
attack reduces model accuracy to 30%. This is significantly
weaker than the original Madry et al. (2018) model that
does not use thermometer encoding. Because this model is
trained against the (comparatively weak) LS-PGA attack, it
is unable to adapt to the stronger attack we present above.
Figure 1 shows a comparison of thermometer encoding, with
and without adversarial training, against the baseline classi-
fier, over a range of perturbation magnitudes, demonstrating
that thermometer encoding provides limited value.
5.2.2. INPUT TRANSFORMATIONS
Defense Details. Guo et al. (2018) propose five input
transformations to counter adversarial examples.
As a baseline, the authors evaluate image cropping and
rescaling, bit-depth reduction, and JPEG compression.
Then the authors suggest two new transformations: (a) ran-
domly drop pixels and restore them by performing total
variance minimization; and (b) image quilting: reconstruct
images by replacing small patches with patches from “clean”
images, using minimum graph cuts in overlapping boundary
regions to remove edge artifacts.
4That is, a thermometer encoded model that is trained using
the approach of (Madry et al., 2018).
The authors explore different combinations of input trans-
formations along with different underlying ImageNet classi-
fiers, including adversarially trained models. They find that
input transformations provide protection even with a vanilla
classifier.
Discussion. The authors find that a ResNet-50 classifier
provides a varying degree of accuracy for each of the five
proposed input transformations under the strongest attack
with a normalized `2 dissimilarity of 0.01, with the strongest
defenses achieving over 60% top-1 accuracy. We reproduce
these results when evaluating an InceptionV3 classifier.
The authors do not succeed in white-box attacks, credit-
ing lack of access to test-time randomness as “particularly
crucial in developing strong defenses” (Guo et al., 2018). 5
Evaluation. It is possible to bypass each defense inde-
pendently (and ensembles of defenses usually are not much
stronger than the strongest sub-component (He et al., 2017)).
We circumvent image cropping and rescaling with a direct
application of EOT. To circumvent bit-depth reduction and
JPEG compression, we use BPDA and approximate the
backward pass with the identity function. To circumvent
total variance minimization and image quilting, which are
both non-differentiable and randomized, we apply EOT and
use BPDA to approximate the gradient through the transfor-
mation. With our attack, we achieve 100% targeted attack
success rate and accuracy drops to 0% for the strongest de-
fense under the smallest perturbation budget considered in
Guo et al. (2018), a root-mean-square perturbation of 0.05
(and a “normalized” `2 perturbation as defined in Guo et al.
(2018) of 0.01).
5.2.3. LOCAL INTRINSIC DIMENSIONALITY (LID)
LID is a general-purpose metric that measures the distance
from an input to its neighbors. Ma et al. (2018) propose
using LID to characterize properties of adversarial examples.
The authors emphasize that this classifier is not intended as a
defense against adversarial examples 6, however the authors
argue that it is a robust method for detecting adversarial
examples that is not easy to evade by attempting their own
adaptive attack and showing it fails.
Analysis Overview. Instead of actively attacking the de-
tection method, we find that LID is not able to detect high
confidence adversarial examples (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a),
even in the unrealistic threat model where the adversary is
entirely oblivious to the defense and generates adversarial
examples on the original classifier. A full discussion of this
5This defense may be stronger in a threat model where the
adversary does not have complete information about the exact
quilting process used (personal communication with authors).
6Personal communication with authors.
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attack is given in Appendix A.
5.3. Stochastic Gradients
5.3.1. STOCHASTIC ACTIVATION PRUNING (SAP)
Defense Details. SAP (Dhillon et al., 2018) introduces
randomness into the evaluation of a neural network to de-
fend against adversarial examples. SAP randomly drops
some neurons of each layer f i to 0 with probability pro-
portional to their absolute value. That is, SAP essentially
applies dropout at each layer where instead of dropping with
uniform probability, nodes are dropped with a weighted dis-
tribution. Values which are retained are scaled up (as is
done in dropout) to retain accuracy. Applying SAP de-
creases clean classification accuracy slightly, with a higher
drop probability decreasing accuracy, but increasing robust-
ness. We study various levels of drop probability and find
they lead to similar robustness numbers.
Discussion. The authors only evaluate SAP by taking a
single step in the gradient direction (Dhillon et al., 2018).
While taking a single step in the direction of the gradient
can be effective on non-randomized neural networks, when
randomization is used, computing the gradient with respect
to one sample of the randomness is ineffective.
Evaluation. To resolve this difficulty, we estimate the gra-
dients by computing the expectation over instantiations of
randomness. At each iteration of gradient descent, instead
of taking a step in the direction of ∇xf(x) we move in the
direction of
∑k
i=1∇xf(x) where each invocation is ran-
domized with SAP. We have found that choosing k = 10
provides useful gradients. We additionally had to resolve
a numerical instability when computing gradients: this de-
fense caused computing a backward pass to cause exploding
gradients due to division by numbers very close to 0.
With these approaches, we are able to reduce SAP model
accuracy to 9% at  = .015, and 0% at  = 0.031. If
we consider an attack successful only when an example
is classified incorrectly 10 times out of 10 (and consider it
correctly classified if it is ever classified as the correct label),
model accuracy is below 10% with  = 0.031.
5.3.2. MITIGATING THROUGH RANDOMIZATION
Defense Details. Xie et al. (2018) propose to defend
against adversarial examples by adding a randomization
layer before the input to the classifier. For a classifier that
takes a 299× 299 input, the defense first randomly rescales
the image to a r × r image, with r ∈ [299, 331), and then
randomly zero-pads the image so that the result is 331×331.
The output is then fed to the classifier.
Discussion. The authors consider three attack scenarios:
vanilla attack (an attack on the original classifier), single-
pattern attack (an attack assuming some fixed randomization
pattern), and ensemble-pattern attack (an attack over a small
ensemble of fixed randomization patterns). The authors
strongest attack reduces InceptionV3 model accuracy to
32.8% top-1 accuracy (over images that were originally
classified correctly).
The authors dismiss a stronger attack over larger choices
of randomness, stating that it would be “computationally
impossible” (emphasis ours) and that such an attack “may
not even converge” (Xie et al., 2018).
Evaluation. We find the authors’ ensemble attack overfits
to the ensemble with fixed randomization. We bypass this
defense by applying EOT, optimizing over the (in this case,
discrete) distribution of transformations.
Using this attack, even if we consider the attack successful
only when an example is classified incorrectly 10 times out
of 10, we achieve 100% targeted attack success rate and
reduce the accuracy of the classifier from 32.8% to 0.0%
with a maximum `∞ perturbation of  = 0.031.
5.4. Vanishing & Exploding Gradients
5.4.1. PIXELDEFEND
Defense Details. Song et al. (2018) propose using a
PixelCNN generative model to project a potential adver-
sarial example back onto the data manifold before feeding
it into a classifier. The authors argue that adversarial ex-
amples mainly lie in the low-probability region of the data
distribution. PixelDefend “purifies” adversarially perturbed
images prior to classification by using a greedy decoding
procedure to approximate finding the highest probability
example within an -ball of the input image.
Discussion. The authors evaluate PixelDefend on
CIFAR-10 over various classifiers and perturbation budgets.
With a maximum `∞ perturbation of  = 0.031, PixelDe-
fend claims 46% accuracy (with a vanilla ResNet classifier).
The authors dismiss the possibility of end-to-end attacks on
PixelDefend due to the difficulty of differentiating through
an unrolled version of PixelDefend due to vanishing
gradients and computation cost.
Evaluation. We sidestep the problem of computing gradi-
ents through an unrolled version of PixelDefend by approxi-
mating gradients with BPDA, and we successfully mount
an end-to-end attack using this technique 7. With this attack,
7In place of a PixelCNN, due to the availability of a pre-trained
model, we use a PixelCNN++ (Salimans et al., 2017) and discretize
the mixture of logistics to produce a 256-way softmax.
Obfuscated Gradients Give a False Sense of Security: Circumventing Defenses to Adversarial Examples
we can reduce the accuracy of a naturally trained classifier
which achieves 95% accuracy to 9% with a maximum `∞
perturbation of  = 0.031. We find that combining adversar-
ial training (Madry et al., 2018) with PixelDefend provides
no additional robustness over just using the adversarially
trained classifier.
5.4.2. DEFENSE-GAN
Defense-GAN (Samangouei et al., 2018) uses a Generative
Adversarial Network (Goodfellow et al., 2014a) to project
samples onto the manifold of the generator before classi-
fying them. That is, the intuition behind this defense is
nearly identical to PixelDefend, but using a GAN instead
of a PixelCNN. We therefore summarize results here and
present the full details in Appendix B.
Analysis Overview. Defense-GAN is not argued secure
on CIFAR-10, so we use MNIST. We find that adversarial
examples exist on the manifold defined by the generator.
That is, we show that we are able to construct an adversarial
example x′ = G(z) so that x′ ≈ x but c(x) 6= c(x′). As
such, a perfect projector would not modify this example x′
because it exists on the manifold described by the generator.
However, while this attack would defeat a perfect projector
mapping x to its nearest point on G(z), the imperfect gradi-
ent descent based approach taken by Defense-GAN does not
perfectly preserve points on the manifold. We therefore con-
struct a second attack using BPDA to evade Defense-GAN,
although at only a 45% success rate.
6. Discussion
Having demonstrated attacks on these seven defenses, we
now take a step back and discuss the method of evaluating a
defense against adversarial examples.
The papers we study use a variety of approaches in eval-
uating robustness of the proposed defenses. We list what
we believe to be the most important points to keep in mind
while building and evaluating defenses. Much of what we
describe below has been discussed in prior work (Carlini &
Wagner, 2017a; Madry et al., 2018); we repeat these points
here and offer our own perspective for completeness.
6.1. Define a (realistic) threat model
A threat model specifies the conditions under which a de-
fense argues security: a precise threat model allows for an
exact understanding of the setting under which the defense is
meant to work. Prior work has used words including white-
box, grey-box, black-box, and no-box to describe slightly
different threat models, often overloading the same word.
Instead of attempting to, yet again, redefine the vocabulary,
we enumerate the various aspects of a defense that might
be revealed to the adversary or held secret to the defender:
model architecture and model weights; training algorithm
and training data; test time randomness (either the values
chosen or the distribution); and, if the model weights are
held secret, whether query access is allowed (and if so, the
type of output, e.g. logits or only the top label).
While there are some aspects of a defense that might be
held secret, threat models should not contain unrealistic
constraints. We believe any compelling threat model should
at the very least grant knowledge of the model architecture,
training algorithm, and allow query access.
It is not meaningful to restrict the computational power of
an adversary artificially (e.g., to fewer than several thousand
attack iterations). If two defenses are equally robust but gen-
erating adversarial examples on one takes one second and
another takes ten seconds, the robustness has not increased.
6.2. Make specific, testable claims
Specific, testable claims in a clear threat model precisely
convey the claimed robustness of a defense. For example, a
complete claim might be: “We achieve 90% accuracy when
bounded by `∞ distortion with  = 0.031, when the attacker
has full white-box access.”
In this paper, we study all papers under the threat model
the authors define. However, if a paper is evaluated under
a different threat model, explicitly stating so makes it clear
that the original paper’s claims are not being violated.
A defense being specified completely, with all hyperpa-
rameters given, is a prerequisite for claims to be testable.
Releasing source code and a pre-trained model along with
the paper describing a specific threat model and robustness
claims is perhaps the most useful method of making testable
claims. At the time of writing this paper, four of the defenses
we study made complete source code available (Madry et al.,
2018; Ma et al., 2018; Guo et al., 2018; Xie et al., 2018).
6.3. Evaluate against adaptive attacks
A strong defense is robust not only against existing attacks,
but also against future attacks within the specified threat
model. A necessary component of any defense proposal is
therefore an attempt at an adaptive attack.
An adaptive attack is one that is constructed after a defense
has been completely specified, where the adversary takes ad-
vantage of knowledge of the defense and is only restricted by
the threat model. One useful attack approach is to perform
many attacks and report the mean over the best attack per im-
age. That is, for a set of attacks a ∈ A instead of reporting
the value min
a∈A
mean
x∈A
f(a(x)) report mean
x∈A
min
a∈A
f(a(x)).
If a defense is modified after an evaluation, an adaptive
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attack is one that considers knowledge of the new defense.
In this way, concluding an evaluation with a final adaptive
attack can be seen as analogous to evaluating a model on
the test data.
7. Conclusion
Constructing defenses to adversarial examples requires de-
fending against not only existing attacks but also future
attacks that may be developed. In this paper, we identify
obfuscated gradients, a phenomenon exhibited by certain
defenses that makes standard gradient-based methods fail
to generate adversarial examples. We develop three attack
techniques to bypass three different types of obfuscated gra-
dients. To evaluate the applicability of our techniques, we
use the ICLR 2018 defenses as a case study, circumventing
seven of nine accepted defenses.
More generally, we hope that future work will be able to
avoid relying on obfuscated gradients (and other methods
that only prevent gradient descent-based attacks) for per-
ceived robustness, and use our evaluation approach to detect
when this occurs. Defending against adversarial examples
is an important area of research and we believe performing
a careful, thorough evaluation is a critical step that can not
be overlooked when designing defenses.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Aleksander Madry, Andrew Ilyas, and
Aditi Raghunathan for helpful comments on an early draft
of this paper. We thank Bo Li, Xingjun Ma, Laurens van der
Maaten, Aurko Roy, Yang Song, and Cihang Xie for useful
discussion and insights on their defenses.
This work was partially supported by the National Science
Foundation through award CNS-1514457, Qualcomm, and
the Hewlett Foundation through the Center for Long-Term
Cybersecurity.
References
Amsaleg, L., Chelly, O., Furon, T., Girard, S., Houle, M. E.,
Kawarabayashi, K.-i., and Nett, M. Estimating local in-
trinsic dimensionality. In Proceedings of the 21th ACM
SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Dis-
covery and Data Mining, pp. 29–38. ACM, 2015.
Athalye, A., Engstrom, L., Ilyas, A., and Kwok, K. Syn-
thesizing robust adversarial examples. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1707.07397, 2017.
Bengio, Y., Le´onard, N., and Courville, A. Estimating or
propagating gradients through stochastic neurons for con-
ditional computation. arXiv preprint arXiv:1308.3432,
2013.
Biggio, B., Corona, I., Maiorca, D., Nelson, B., Sˇrndic´, N.,
Laskov, P., Giacinto, G., and Roli, F. Evasion attacks
against machine learning at test time. In Joint European
Conference on Machine Learning and Knowledge Dis-
covery in Databases, pp. 387–402. Springer, 2013.
Buckman, J., Roy, A., Raffel, C., and Goodfellow, I. Ther-
mometer encoding: One hot way to resist adversarial ex-
amples. International Conference on Learning Represen-
tations, 2018. URL https://openreview.net/
forum?id=S18Su--CW. accepted as poster.
Carlini, N. and Wagner, D. Adversarial examples are not
easily detected: Bypassing ten detection methods. AISec,
2017a.
Carlini, N. and Wagner, D. Magnet and “efficient defenses
against adversarial attacks” are not robust to adversarial
examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1711.08478, 2017b.
Carlini, N. and Wagner, D. Towards evaluating the robust-
ness of neural networks. In IEEE Symposium on Security
& Privacy, 2017c.
Dhillon, G. S., Azizzadenesheli, K., Bernstein, J. D., Kos-
saifi, J., Khanna, A., Lipton, Z. C., and Anandkumar,
A. Stochastic activation pruning for robust adversarial
defense. International Conference on Learning Represen-
tations, 2018. URL https://openreview.net/
forum?id=H1uR4GZRZ. accepted as poster.
Goodfellow, I., Pouget-Abadie, J., Mirza, M., Xu, B.,
Warde-Farley, D., Ozair, S., Courville, A., and Bengio,
Y. Generative adversarial nets. In Advances in neural
information processing systems, pp. 2672–2680, 2014a.
Goodfellow, I. J., Shlens, J., and Szegedy, C. Explain-
ing and harnessing adversarial examples. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1412.6572, 2014b.
Gulrajani, I., Ahmed, F., Arjovsky, M., Dumoulin, V., and
Courville, A. Improved training of wasserstein gans.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1704.00028, 2017.
Guo, C., Rana, M., Cisse, M., and van der Maaten, L. Coun-
tering adversarial images using input transformations.
International Conference on Learning Representations,
2018. URL https://openreview.net/forum?
id=SyJ7ClWCb. accepted as poster.
He, K., Zhang, X., Ren, S., and Sun, J. Deep residual learn-
ing for image recognition. In Proceedings of the IEEE
conference on computer vision and pattern recognition,
pp. 770–778, 2016.
He, W., Wei, J., Chen, X., Carlini, N., and Song, D. Adver-
sarial example defenses: Ensembles of weak defenses are
not strong. arXiv preprint arXiv:1706.04701, 2017.
Obfuscated Gradients Give a False Sense of Security: Circumventing Defenses to Adversarial Examples
Ilyas, A., Jalal, A., Asteri, E., Daskalakis, C., and Di-
makis, A. G. The robust manifold defense: Adversar-
ial training using generative models. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1712.09196, 2017.
Kurakin, A., Goodfellow, I., and Bengio, S. Adversar-
ial examples in the physical world. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1607.02533, 2016a.
Kurakin, A., Goodfellow, I. J., and Bengio, S. Ad-
versarial machine learning at scale. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1611.01236, 2016b.
Ma, X., Li, B., Wang, Y., Erfani, S. M., Wijewickrema, S.,
Schoenebeck, G., Houle, M. E., Song, D., and Bailey, J.
Characterizing adversarial subspaces using local intrinsic
dimensionality. International Conference on Learning
Representations, 2018. URL https://openreview.
net/forum?id=B1gJ1L2aW. accepted as oral pre-
sentation.
Madry, A., Makelov, A., Schmidt, L., Tsipras, D., and
Vladu, A. Towards deep learning models resistant to ad-
versarial attacks. International Conference on Learning
Representations, 2018. URL https://openreview.
net/forum?id=rJzIBfZAb. accepted as poster.
Na, T., Ko, J. H., and Mukhopadhyay, S. Cascade adver-
sarial machine learning regularized with a unified embed-
ding. In International Conference on Learning Represen-
tations, 2018. URL https://openreview.net/
forum?id=HyRVBzap-.
Papernot, N., McDaniel, P., Goodfellow, I., Jha, S., Ce-
lik, Z. B., and Swami, A. Practical black-box attacks
against machine learning. In Proceedings of the 2017
ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communica-
tions Security, ASIA CCS ’17, pp. 506–519, New York,
NY, USA, 2017. ACM. ISBN 978-1-4503-4944-4. doi:
10.1145/3052973.3053009. URL http://doi.acm.
org/10.1145/3052973.3053009.
Raghunathan, A., Steinhardt, J., and Liang, P. Certified de-
fenses against adversarial examples. International Confer-
ence on Learning Representations, 2018. URL https:
//openreview.net/forum?id=Bys4ob-Rb.
Rumelhart, D. E., Hinton, G. E., and Williams, R. J. Learn-
ing representations by back-propagating errors. Nature,
323:533–536, 1986.
Salimans, T., Karpathy, A., Chen, X., and Kingma, D. P.
Pixelcnn++: A pixelcnn implementation with discretized
logistic mixture likelihood and other modifications. In
ICLR, 2017.
Samangouei, P., Kabkab, M., and Chellappa, R. Defense-
gan: Protecting classifiers against adversarial attacks
using generative models. International Conference
on Learning Representations, 2018. URL https://
openreview.net/forum?id=BkJ3ibb0-. ac-
cepted as poster.
Sharma, Y. and Chen, P.-Y. Attacking the madry de-
fense model with L1-based adversarial examples. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1710.10733, 2017.
Sinha, A., Namkoong, H., and Duchi, J. Certifiable distri-
butional robustness with principled adversarial training.
International Conference on Learning Representations,
2018. URL https://openreview.net/forum?
id=Hk6kPgZA-.
Song, Y., Kim, T., Nowozin, S., Ermon, S., and Kush-
man, N. Pixeldefend: Leveraging generative models
to understand and defend against adversarial examples.
International Conference on Learning Representations,
2018. URL https://openreview.net/forum?
id=rJUYGxbCW. accepted as poster.
Szegedy, C., Zaremba, W., Sutskever, I., Bruna, J., Erhan,
D., Goodfellow, I., and Fergus, R. Intriguing properties
of neural networks. ICLR, 2013.
Szegedy, C., Vanhoucke, V., Ioffe, S., Shlens, J., and Wojna,
Z. Rethinking the inception architecture for computer
vision. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Com-
puter Vision and Pattern Recognition, pp. 2818–2826,
2016.
Trame`r, F., Kurakin, A., Papernot, N., Goodfellow, I.,
Boneh, D., and McDaniel, P. Ensemble adversarial train-
ing: Attacks and defenses. International Conference
on Learning Representations, 2018. URL https://
openreview.net/forum?id=rkZvSe-RZ. ac-
cepted as poster.
Xie, C., Wang, J., Zhang, Z., Ren, Z., and Yuille, A. Mit-
igating adversarial effects through randomization. In-
ternational Conference on Learning Representations,
2018. URL https://openreview.net/forum?
id=Sk9yuql0Z. accepted as poster.
Zagoruyko, S. and Komodakis, N. Wide residual networks.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1605.07146, 2016.
Obfuscated Gradients Give a False Sense of Security: Circumventing Defenses to Adversarial Examples
A. Local Intrinsic Dimensionality
Defense Details. The Local Intrinsic Dimensionality
(Amsaleg et al., 2015) “assesses the space-filling capability
of the region surrounding a reference example, based on the
distance distribution of the example to its neighbors” (Ma
et al., 2018). The authors present evidence that the LID is
significantly larger for adversarial examples generated by
existing attacks than for normal images, and they construct a
classifier that can distinguish these adversarial images from
normal images. Again, the authors indicate that LID is not
intended as a defense and only should be used to explore
properties of adversarial examples. However, it would be
natural to wonder whether it would be effective as a defense,
so we study its robustness; our results confirm that it is
not adequate as a defense. The method used to compute
the LID relies on finding the k nearest neighbors, a non-
differentiable operation, rendering gradient descent based
methods ineffective.
Let S be a mini-batch of N clean examples. Let ri(x)
denote the distance (under metric d(x, y)) between sample
x and its i-th nearest neighbor in S (under metric d). Then
LID can be approximated by
LIDd(x) = −
(
1
k
k∑
i=1
log
ri(x)
rk(x)
)−1
where k is a defense hyperparameter the controls the num-
ber of nearest neighbors to consider. The authors use the
distance function
dj(x, y) =
∥∥f1..j(x)− f1..j(y)∥∥ 2
to measure the distance between the jth activation layers.
The authors compute a vector of LID values for each sample:
−−→
LID(x) = {LIDdj (x)}nj=1.
Finally, they compute the
−−→
LID(x) over the training data
and adversarial examples generated on the training data,
and train a logistic regression classifier to detect adversarial
examples. We are grateful to the authors for releasing their
complete source code.
Discussion. While LID is not a defense itself, the authors
assess the ability of LID to detect different types of attacks.
Through solving the formulation
min. |x− x′|22 + α (`(x′) + LID-loss(x′))
the authors attempt to determine if the LID metric is a good
metric for detecting adversarial examples. Here, LID-loss(·)
is a function that can be minimized to reduce the LID score.
However, the authors report that this modified attack still
achieves 0% success. Because Carlini and Wagner’s `2
attack is unbounded, any time the attack does not reach
100% success indicates that the attack became stuck in a
local minima. When this happens, it is often possible to
slightly modify the loss function and return to 100% attack
success (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b).
In this case, we observe the reason that performing this
type of adaptive attack fails is that gradient descent does
not succeed in optimizing the LID loss, even though the
LID computation is differentiable. Computing the LID term
involves computing the k-nearest neighbors when comput-
ing ri(x). Minimizing the gradient of the distance to the
current k-nearest neighbors is not representative of the true
direction to travel in for the optimal set of k-nearest neigh-
bors. As a consequence, we find that adversarial examples
generated with gradient methods when penalizing for a high
LID either (a) are not adversarial; or (b) are detected as
adversarial, despite penalizing for the LID loss.
Evaluation. We now evaluate what would happen if a
defense would directly apply LID to detect adversarial ex-
amples. Instead of performing gradient descent over a term
that is difficult to differentiate through, we have found that
generating high confidence adversarial examples (Carlini &
Wagner, 2017a) (completely oblivious to to the detector) is
sufficient to fool this detector. We obtain from the authors
their detector trained on both the Carlini and Wagner’s `2
attack and train our own on the Fast Gradient Sign attack,
both of which were found to be effective at detecting adver-
sarial examples generated by other methods. By generating
high-confidence adversarial examples minimizing `∞ dis-
tortion, we are able to reduce model accuracy to 2% success
within  = 0.015. LID reports these adversarial examples
are benign at a 97% rate (unmodified test data is flagged as
benign with a 98% rate).
This evaluation demonstrates that the LID metric can be
circumvented, and future work should carefully evaluate if
building a detector relying on LID is robust to adversarial
examples explicitly targeting such a detector. This work
also raises questions whether a large LID is a fundamental
characteristic of all adversarial examples, or whether it is a
by-product of certain attacks.
B. Defense-GAN
Defense Details. The defender first trains a Generative
Adversarial Network with a generator G(z) that maps sam-
ples from a latent space (typically z ∼ N (0, 1)) to images
that look like training data. Defense-GAN takes a trained
classifier f(·), and to classify an input x, instead of return-
ing f(x), returns f(arg minz |G(z)− x|). To perform this
projection to the manifold, the authors take many steps of
gradient descent starting from different random initializa-
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tions.
Defense-GAN was not shown to be effective on CIFAR-10.
We therefore evaluate it on MNIST (where it was argued to
be secure).
Discussion. In Samangouei et al. (2018), the authors con-
struct a white-box attack by unrolling the gradient descent
used during classification. Despite an unbounded `2 per-
turbation size, Carlini and Wagner’s attack only reaches
30% misclassification rate on the most vulnerable model
and under 5% on the strongest. This leads us to believe that
unrolling gradient descent breaks gradients.
Evaluation. We find that adversarial examples do exist
on the data manifold as described by the generator G(·).
However, Defense-GAN does not completely project to
the projection of the generator, and therefore often does not
identify these adversarial examples actually on the manifold.
We therefore present two evaluations. In the first, we as-
sume that Defense-GAN were to able to perfectly project
to the data manifold, and give a construction for generating
adversarial examples. In the second, we take the actual im-
plementation of Defense-GAN as it is, and perform BPDA
to generate adversarial examples with 50% success under
reasonable `2 bounds.
Evaluation A. Performing the manifold projection is non-
trivial as an inner optimization step when generating adver-
sarial examples. To sidestep this difficulty, we show that
adversarial examples exist directly on the projection of the
generator. That is, we construct an adversarial example
x′ = G(z∗) so that |x− x′| is small and c(x) 6= c(x′).
To do this, we solve the re-parameterized formulation
min. ‖G(z)− x‖22 + c · `(G(z)).
We initialize z = arg minz |G(z)−x| (also found via gradi-
ent descent). We train a WGAN using the code the authors
provide (Gulrajani et al., 2017), and a MNIST CNN to
99.3% accuracy.
We run for 50k iterations of gradient descent for generating
each adversarial example; this takes under one minute per
instance. The unsecured classifier requires a mean `2 distor-
tion of 0.0019 (per-pixel normalized, 1.45 un-normalized)
to fool. When we mount our attack, we require a mean
distortion of 0.0027, an increase in distortion of 1.46×; see
Figure 2 for examples of adversarial examples. The reason
our attacks succeed with 100% success without suffering
from vanishing or exploding gradients is that our gradient
computation only needs to differentiate through the genera-
tor G(·) once.
Figure 2. Images on the MNIST test set. Row 1: Clean images.
Row 2: Adversarial examples on an unsecured classifier. Row 3:
Adversarial examples on Defense-GAN.
Concurrent to our work, Ilyas et al. (2017) also develop a
nearly identical approach to Defense-GAN; they also find
it is vulnerable to the attack we outline above, but increase
the robustness further with adversarial training. We do not
evaluate this extended approach.
Evaluation B. The above attack does not succeed on
Defense-GAN. While the adversarial examples are directly
on the projection of the Generator, the projection process
will actually move it off the projection.
To mount an attack on the approximate projection process,
we use the BPDA attack regularized for `2 distortion. Our
attack approach is identical to that of PixelDefend, except
we replace the manifold projection with a PixelCNN with
the manifold projection by gradient descent on the GAN.
Under these settings, we succeed at reducing model accu-
racy to 55% with a maximum normalized distortion of .0051
for successful attacks.
